Analysis on the relationship between water resources and environmental change in Northern Thailand

1 Introduction

Is the glass half empty or half full? The same person may have a different answer depending on his or her perception of the context.For example,if a person has abundant access to resources,the answer might be “half empty.” In contrast,if that person has insufficient access to resources,the answer might be “half full.” The same person’s perception can change.Therefore,each stakeholder may have a distinct perception in accordance with every stake in the vast environmental uncertainty that he or she may have at a given point in time [1].

Specifically,it is important to understand why severe water conflicts are historically repeated in certain watersheds,whereas other watersheds in a similar physical setting have never experienced any conflict.Northern Thailand,in particular,has reported severe tension on account of the imbalance between water resource supply and demand because of the increasing demand set against the backdrop of the country’s openness to the globalized market economy.However,only a few watersheds in northern Thailand have experienced repeated conflicts,whereas intense tension exists in a number of watersheds.To tackle this puzzle,the next section (Section 2) compares local precipitation with the historical record of these conflicts.Section 3 focuses on an in-depth field survey,and Section 4 discusses the results.Finally,Section 5 suggests a framework for understanding the repetition of the problem based on the perception gap examined in this study.

2 Repeated water conflicts in northern Thailand

In April 1998,major Thai newspapers reported a water conflict in northern Thailand as a front page story.A large water conflict occurred in the Chom Thong district in the political context of the Thai community forestry bill in the previous year.The articles stated that the tension was so intense that senior officials arrived from Bangkok to control the situation.This is not the first such reported conflict;indeed,water conflicts have repeatedly occurred in the region.

Some political scientists perceive that a severe water shortage leads to a water conflict [2].The amount of precipitation and discharge in 1998 declined sharply because of the El Nino effect in the Mae Tia watershed in Chom Thong (Fig.1).This decline,however,did not have a causal relationship with the water conflict.In the next watershed,Mae Chaem,which is located in a similar physical setting,the amount of rainfall and discharge was lower than that in Mae Tia.However,no such conflict has ever been witnessed in Mae Chaem.

Violence is a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and social relations [3].From the historical record,it is clear that a water shortage alone cannot explain a water conflict.Sharp declines in precipitation occurred in 1986,1990,and 1993 (Fig.1).Yet,a water conflict never occurred in these years.On the other hand,a severe water conflict occurred in the beginning of the 1980s,even resulting in fatalities [4].

Fig.1 Trend of annual precipitation in the Mae Tia and Mae Chaem watersheds.The Mae Tia watershed is located in the Chom Thong district.All the data were gathered by the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature,JSPS Project “Blue Revolution,” and National Research Council of Thailand [5]

3 Gap between reality and perception

3.1 Field survey

A series of field studies were conducted in Chom Thong to address the gap between reality and perception.The data collection consisted of a structured interview that occurred in October 2004 and August 2006,an unstructured interview,and participatory observation.

In Chom Thong,the lowland smallholders can be divided into two groups based on their participation in the 1998 water conflict.One group actively joined the conflict,while the other did not.In this study,a village in the lowland of the Mea Tia watershed (comprising 886 households in 2003) was selected for snowball sampling.

Water shortage involves three aspects:supply,demand,and resource allocation [6].Assuming that these three sides are independent of each other,the structured interview aimed to clarify the difference in the gap between reality and perception regarding the water shortage between those who participated in the conflict and those who did not.

3.2 Methodology of the structured interview

There is no general scientific agreement on the method to quantify a water shortage.As the mechanism of a water shortage depends on the local context,the appropriate index can be crafted on the basis of local opinion.Through discussions with locals such as village leaders,academicians,and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),the following six indices were structured (Table1).

Table1 Indices of water shortages in six categories.Three aspects (supply,demand,and allocation) exist in terms of“reality” and “perception”

Aspect Supply Side Demand Side Allocation Side Reality Maximum annual number of rice croppings without pumping Percentage of total income earned from selling cash crops Standard deviation of the maximum annual number of rice croppings Perception Percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to people living in uplands Percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to people living in lowlands Percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to the water association

The first index of reality,namely supply,was defined as the “maximum annual number of rice croppings without pumping.” All the villagers residing in this region are engaged in rice cropping,and the number of croppings depends on the amount of water supply.The second index,that is,demand,is defined as the “percentage of total income earned from selling cash crops.” While the rice is mostly used for self-consumption,the recent market integration has changed various aspects such as cash cropping,migrant labor,and livestock,among which cash cropping is the only activity that consumes comparatively large volumes of water.Assuming villagers’ market integration,the income dependence of cash cropping may represent the water demand in reality.The last index,namely allocation,is measured as the “standard deviation of the maximum annual number of rice croppings” among those who participated the conflict and those who did not.

Regarding the perception aspect,the first index,supply,is defined as the “percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to people living in uplands.” Some of the lowlanders’ perceive that the surging demand by people living in the uplands is responsible for the severe water shortage in the lowlands.Conversely,the second aspect of demand is defined as the “percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to people living in lowlands.” Some lowlanders realize that they themselves might be responsible for the water shortage caused by the increase in their harvests/cash cropping activities.The third index of allocation is defined as the “percentage of those who attribute water shortage in lowlands to the water association.” Traditionally,the community water association in northern Thailand is well organized.This association is in charge of water allocation.Some villagers accuse this water association of being responsible for the water shortages.

3.3 Results

The results regarding the first aspect,“reality,” are displayed in Table2.The participation rate is higher when(i) the maximum annual number of rice croppings exceeds two (68% ＞ 39%) and (ii) selling cash crops is the biggest source of income (75% ＞ 17%).On the distribution side,there are no significant differences between those who participated in the conflict and those who did not,which means that the allocation side could be disregarded in this causal mechanism.Against our intuition,those who joined the conflict benefited via an increase in water supply.On the other hand,those who joined the conflict depended to a greater extent on cash crops for their livelihoods.Thus,with regard to reality,this result implies that rise in water“demand” caused participation in the conflict.

Second,Table3 shows the results regarding perception.The participation rate is higher among (i) those who attribute the water shortage to people living in the uplands(75% ＞ 25%) and (ii) those who do not attribute the water shortage to the people living in the lowlands (57% ＞ 24%).Regarding the allocation side,few villagers (11 out of 104) perceive that the water association is to blame for the water shortage,which means that the allocation could be disregarded in this causal mechanism.In sum,those who joined the conflict attribute the water shortage to the water consumption by the uplanders while ignoring their own water demand in the lowlands.Therefore,our result implies that the prevailing perception is that factors associated with supply caused participation in the water conflict.

4 Sustained gap in social relations

4.1 Follow-up survey

The results imply that the participation in the conflict was mainly attributable to the demand side with regard to the aspect of reality and the supply side with regard to perception.Yet,one may question the certainty of this causality given that the collected data arguably present only a snapshot of a protracted period.Perhaps the villagersmay have changed their livelihoods later,in accordance with their surrounding environment.Else,they may have become flexible in their dealings with the local social and power relations by changing their way of life.Thus,in 2006,we conducted follow-up research targeting the same villages,followed by unstructured interviews and focus group discussions.Table4 shows the results of the followup survey.

Table2 Three sides of water shortage with regard to “reality.” All the data are based on the results from the structured interview held in October 2004.On the allocation side,“active” refers to those who actively participated in the 1998 water conflict,while“passive” refers to those who did not participate( ):Number of households.

Supply side:Maximum annual number of rice cropping Demand side:Income from selling cash crops Allocation side:Standard deviation of the index of “Supply Side”Number Participation Biggest Source Participation Water Conflict Standard Deviation 1 (69) 39% Cash Crops (69) 75% Active (60) 0.23＞ 1 (48) 68% Others (48) 17% Passive (57) 0.20

Table3 Three sides of water shortage with regard to “perception.” All the data are based on the results from the structured interview held in October 2004( ):Number of households.

Supply Side:Highlander Demand Side:Lowlander Allocation Side:Water Association Highlander Participation Lowlander Participation Water Association Participation Responsible (61) 75% Responsible (21) 24% Responsible (11) 73%Not Responsible (56) 25% Not Responsible (96) 57% Not Responsible (93) 52%

Table4 Comparison of participation rate between the surveys in 2004 and 2006.The demand side is highlighted under the aspect of “reality” and the supply side,under “perception”( ):Number of households.

Aspect of “Reality”:Participation Rate Aspect of “Perception”:Participation Rate Demand Side 2004 2006 Supply Side 20042006 Biggest income source is cash cropping (28,22)54% 68% Uplanders cause the water shortage(24,29)63% 66%Biggest income source is note cash cropping (29,39)7% 38% Uplanders are not the cause of the water shortage(33,32)6% 34%

As shown,two similar trends were observed between 2004 and 2006.First,regarding “reality,” those who depended on cash cropping in terms of cash income joined the water conflict in greater numbers than those who did not (54% ＞ 7% in 2004 and 68% ＞ 38% in 2006).Second,regarding “perception,” those who perceived uplanders as the cause of the shortage joined the water conflict in greater numbers than those who did not (63% ＞ 6% in 2004 and 66% ＞ 34% in 2006).In both surveys,the supply side of the reality aspect and the demand side of the perception aspect are shown to be the causes behind the participation in the conflict.

However,one may wonder why the participation rates of those who did not depend on cash cropping and who did not blame uplanders were higher in 2006 than in 2004(38% ＞ 7% for “reality,” and 34% ＞ 6% for “perception”).The findings of the unstructured interview showed two notable changes between 2004 and 2006:(i) In the urban area,the number of jobs increased against the backdrop of the recovery from the 1997 crisis,and (ii) the watershed committee had been practically effective since it was set up in 2000 .Therefore,some participants (i) abandoned cash cropping as a cash income generator in rural areas and (ii) stopped their unproductive accusations against the uplanders.As a result,these changes increased the 2006 participation rate of those who did not depend on cash cropping and did not blame the uplanders.This trend was also observed in the follow-up focus group discussions.

In general,villagers changed their livelihoods in accordance with societal,political,and environmental situations,as does the community that was interviewed for the study.In this regard,the critical argument against the snapshot survey addressing causal mechanisms stands.Nonetheless,the follow-up research shows that these flexible changes in livelihoods in these communities did not disqualify the causality mechanism discovered in this study.

4.2 Social context:The Thammanart Foundation

As the causes for the villagers’ participation in the conflict,the demand side stands out with regard to reality while the same is true of the supply side with regard to perception.It is interesting to consider the reason behind this gap between reality and perception in the studied region.A follow-up interview suggests that the key actor is an environmental NGO called the Thammanart Foundation.Located in Chom Thong,the rationale of this foundation is to protect the forest in the upland watershed by evacuating the upland minorities who typically engage in traditional slash and burn practices.

Based on these aims,the foundation has enlarged its activity by attracting a number of domestic and international funding sources.Among its donors,the foundation lists the British,German,and Canadian Embassies in Thailand,the Canada Fund,the Ford Foundation,the Thai-German Development Foundation,the United Nations Environment Programme,the World Wide Fund for Nature,and so on [7].

To gain more political power among the lowlanders,it is rational for the leader of the NGO to try depicting uplanders as the imaginary enemy.This has helped increase local populism.The upland people have been routinely tagged with a number of negative stereotypes by lowlanders,including dirtiness,primitiveness,and even “free sex” [8].Worse,their negative image has been sharply contrasted with the ecological image of the minorities residing in the lowlands,who have been portrayed rather practicing superior agricultural methods from the lowland Thai majority.[9]

Ironically,this supposed enemy was settled in the upper watershed area in the 1960s,and its members changed their livelihoods after the settlement.Though traditionally they were practiced slash and burn agriculture in the mountains,they do not depend on this unsustainable practice today,in contradiction to their typical image.Intentionally,the NGO’s leader has adhered to two Thai narratives:(i) The highland minority is the destroyer of the forest because of its slash and burn agricultural practices,and (ii) more forestland in the uplands promises more water in the lowlands,even in the dry season.Despite the plausible hydrology,the NGO’s leader has emphasized these narratives to support the lowlanders who have encountered frequent water shortages while increasing their cash crop harvests.Therefore,this social and political setting has led to the creation of a perception that is quite different from the reality.

5 Conclusions

An analysis of the gap between reality and perception in the studied region showed that the repeated water conflict can be explained by the following three aspects.First,Chom Thong district recently experienced a latent water shortage.Owing to the economic development policy of the local government,which mandated stringent political interventions,the demand for water has surged,mainly due to the increase in the cash crop harvests.On the other hand,the supply of water resources has remained more or less unchanged and without any significant improvements to the relevant infrastructures and technologies.Then,severe water shortage occurred due to the recent severe decrease in precipitation during the dry season owing to climate change.This caused substantial economic damage to the smallholders who had invested heavily in cash crops.

Second,to cope with this water shortage,some smallholders attributed it to the uplanders,despite the former’s continued dependence on cash crops for their cash incomes.However,the actual situation was based on an environmental narrative created under the prevailing local social and power settings.To ensure their survival,some of the smallholders spontaneously strengthened their vulnerability against drought by abandoning cash cropping as a cash income generator in rural areas.

Third,certain political actors have an incentive to mobilize lowland smallholders to evacuate the upland minorities.Based on this latent water shortage and the vulnerable livelihood structure,the driver for conflicts is feasible if its rationale suits the “perception” of the lowlanders.It is easy for political actors to construct a plausible rationale as they themselves have crafted the perceptions of lowlanders based on local narratives.

Fig.2 System of repeated water conflict in Chom Thong from the lowlander's viewpoint.

In sum,the gap between perception and reality has sustained the higher than sustainable water consumption lifestyle among the lowland villagers,resulting in their vulnerability to droughts.Worse,this process could be in a positive feedback mode as participations in water conflicts would “simplify” lowlanders’ perceptions about accusing the highlanders (Fig.2 ).It is said that people’s adaptability to changes in their environment are attributable to the accuracy of their perceptions and the understanding of reality,namely,of how they see and interpret diverse physical phenomena and the complex web of life [10].Because of this inaccurate perception,the adaptability of the lowlanders is in question.Thus,it is recommended that local institutions such as a watershed committee should be established to demystify this perception.In the context of northern Thailand,such as institutional setting will have significant implications for the inclusion of minorities,such as the people living in the upland areas.